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In this paper we introduce the concept of quantum private channel within the continuous variables
framework (CVPQC) and investigate its properties. In terms of CVPQC we naturally define a
“maximally” mixed state in phase space together with its explicit construction and show that for
increasing number of encryption operations (which sets the length of a shared key between Alice
and Bob) the encrypted state is arbitrarily close to the maximally mixed state in the sense of the
Hilbert-Schmidt distance. We bring the exact solution for the distance dependence and give also
a rough estimate of the necessary number of bits of the shared secret key (i.e. how much classical
resources are needed for an approximate encryption of a generally unknown continuous-variable
state). The definition of the CVPQC is analyzed from the Holevo bound point of view which
determines an upper bound of information about an incoming state an eavesdropper is able to get
from his optimal measurement.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
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I. INTRODUCTION
The task of quantum state encryption [1, 2, 3] (quantum Vernam cipher, quantum one-time pad) is defined as
follows. Let’s suppose that there are two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, and Alice wants to send an arbitrary
unknown quantum state to Bob (the state needn’t to be known either Alice or Bob). They are connected through
the quantum channel which is accessible to Eve’s manipulations. To avoid any possible information leakage from
the state to Eve (via some kind of generalized measurement or state estimation) Alice and Bob share a secret and
random string (classical key) of bits by which Alice chooses a unitary operation from the given (and publicly known)
set. The transformed state is sent to Bob via the quantum channel who applies the same operation to decrypt the
state. For an external observer (e.g. Eve) the state on the channel is a mixture of all possible transformations that
Alice can create because she doesn’t know the secret string. If, moreover, the mixture is independent on the state to
be encrypted then Eve has no chance to deduce any information on the state. We say that the state was perfectly
encrypted. After the formalization of this procedure we get the definition of private quantum channel – PQC [3]. As
the mixture it is advantageous to choose a maximally mixed state – identity density matrix.
It is natural to ask how many operations are needed for encryption of a k-qubit input state. Based on thoughts
on entropy it was shown [2] and later generalized [3] for PQC with ancilla that 2k classical bits are sufficient (i.e.
22k operations). Generally, for perfect encryption of d-dimensional quantum state d2 unitary operations are needed.
Thus, the length of participant’s secret and random key must have at least 2 log d bits [34]. After weakening the
security definition an approximate secrecy was stated in [4] defining of approximate private quantum channel – aPQC.
Then, it was shown that asymptotically just d log d operations are needed for approximate quantum state encryption.
Next progress in this research topic was achieved in [5] where a polynomial algorithm for constructing a set of
encryption/decryption operations suitable for aPQC was presented.
In this paper we investigate the possibility of quantum state encryption for continuous variables (CV) [6]. Under
CV we understand two conjugate observables such as e.g. position and momentum of a particle. Especially, we
concentrate on coherent states states which Wigner function has the form of the normalized Gaussian distribution.
Gaussian states are the most important class of CV states used in quantum communication and computation [7].
The most of intriguing processes and algorithms discovered for discrete d-level quantum systems were also generalized
∗Electronic address: kbradler@epot.cz
2for CV. Among others, let’s mention CV quantum state teleportation [8, 9], CV quantum state cloning [10] and
quantum computation with CV [11]. Importantly, a great progress was made in quantum key distribution (QKD)
based on CV where theoretical groundwork was laid [12, 13, 14, 15, 16] and experiments were performed [17, 18].
After brief introducing into the questions of distances used in quantum information theory in Sec. II the main part
follows in Sec. III and Sec. IV. There we present the notion of CV quantum state encryption and in the later we
define a continuous-variable private quantum channel (CVPQC). This, foremost, consists of defining the “maximally”
mixed state within the context of continuous variables and estimating the length of a secret shared key between Alice
and Bob for a given secrecy (by secrecy it is meant the HS distance between “maximally” mixed and the investigated
state). In Sec. IV we will touch the question of “maximality” of the mixed state (from now on, let’s omit the
apostrophes) in the context of bosonic channels [19, 20] and their generalized lossy [21] and Gaussian relatives [22].
We will also discuss important differences between discrete and CV encryption from the viewpoint of eavesdropping
followed by the calculation of the Holevo bound limiting information accessible to Eve from the encrypted channel.
Necessary Appendices come at the end of the paper. In Appendix A we give a derivation of the exact formula for the
HS distance. The object of Appendix B is to inference the mentioned estimate of the HS distance.
II. MEASURES OF QUANTUM STATES CLOSENESS
Quantum states can be distinguished in the sense of their mutual distance. The distance is usually induced by a
norm defined on the space of quantum states. This is the case of Schatten p-norm
‖A‖p = (Tr (|A|p))
1
p = (Tr (Ap))
1
p , (1)
where |A| =
√
A†A and the last equation is valid for A = A†. If A = ̺1 − ̺2 the Hermiticity of A is still preserved
and for p = 2 we get the Hilbert-Schmidt (HS) distance
DHS(̺1, ̺2) = ‖̺1 − ̺2‖2 =
√
Tr ((̺1 − ̺2)2). (2)
On the other hand, there is a whole family of distances based on Uhlmann’s fidelity [23]
F (ρ1, ρ2) = Tr
(
(
√
ρ1ρ2
√
ρ1)
1
2
)
. (3)
One of them is Bures distance [24]
DB(̺1, ̺2) =
(
2− 2Tr
√√
̺1̺2
√
̺1
) 1
2
(4)
which coincides with the HS distance if ̺1, ̺2 are pure states.
There is a certain equivocation which distance is more suitable for a given task in QIT where a general problem
of quantum state distinguishability or closeness has to be resolved. Both distances have many useful properties and
they are subject of detailed investigation [26]. For example, output “quality” of a quantum state in the problem of
universal quantum-copying machine was first analyzed with the help of the HS distance [27] and later revisited from
the viewpoint of the Bures and trace distance (Schatten p-norm (1) for p = 1) [28]. Other problem, among others,
where closeness of two quantum states plays a significant role is quantum state estimation [29]. Here the closeness of
estimated states is often measured by the HS distance [30].
The motivation for using the HS distance in our calculation is two-fold. First, the security criterion for approximate
quantum state encryption [4] is based on the operator distance induced by operator norm (p→∞ in (1)) while some
other results therein are calculated for the trace distance which is in some sense weaker than the operator distance
(the reason is computational difficulty). Second, for our purpose we need to calculate distance between two infinitely-
dimensional mixed states what is difficult in the case of all fidelity based distances. However, we suppose that the
HS distance is a good choice for coherent states and provides an adequate view on measure of the closeness of two
states.
3III. CV STATE ENCRYPTION AND ITS ANALYSIS
Let’s define the task of CV state encryption. As in the case of discrete variable quantum state encryption, Alice and
Bob are interconnected via a quantum channel which is fully accessible to Eve’s manipulations. Both legal participants
share a secret string of random bits (key) which sufficient length is, among others, subject of this paper. The key
indexes several unitary operations which Alice/Bob chooses to encrypt/decrypt single-mode coherent states. The
purpose of the encryption is to secure these states from leakage of any information about them to an eavesdropper
(Eve). The way to achieve this task is to “randomize” every coherent state to be close as much as possible to a
maximally mixed state (maximally in the sense specified next). The randomization is performed with several publicly
known unitary operations (it is meant that the set from which participants choose is known but the particular
sequence of operations from the set is given by the key which is kept secret). So, suppose that Alice generates or
gets an arbitrary and generally unknown single-mode coherent state. The only public knowledge about the state is
its appearance somewhere inside the circle of radius b in phase space with the given distribution probability. Here we
suppose that states occur with the same probability for all r ≤ b and with zero probability elsewhere.
Suppose for a while that Alice encrypts a vacuum state. This situation will be immediately generalized with the
help of the HS distance properties for an unknown coherent state within the circle of radius b as stated in the previous
paragraph. The first problem we have to tackle is the definition of a maximally (or completely) mixed state. Here the
situation is different from, generally, d-dimensional discrete Hilbert space where a normalized unit matrix is considered
as the maximally mixed state. This is inappropriate in phase space nevertheless we may inspire ourselves in a way the
discrete maximally mixed state is generated. In fact, we get the maximally mixed state (in case of qubits ̺V = ̺rϑϕ)
by integrating out over all density matrix populating the Bloch sphere 1 ∝ ∫ ̺V dV (irrespective of the fact that the
finite number of unitary operations suffice for this task as the theory of PQC learns). Similarly, as a maximally mixed
state [35] we can naturally choose an integral performed over all possible single-mode states within the circle of radius
r ≤ b
1 b =
1
C
∫
d2α|α〉〈α| = 1
C
∞∑
m,n=0
|m〉〈n|
∫ 2pi
0
dϑ
∫ b
0
dr e−r
2 rm+n+1√
m!n!
ei(m−n)ϑ =
2π
C
∞∑
n=0
|n〉〈n|
n!
∫ b
0
dr e−r
2
r2n+1
=
π
C
∞∑
n=0
|n〉〈n|
n!
∫ b2
0
dx e−xxn =
π
C
exp
(−b2) ∞∑
n=0
(
exp
(
b2
)− n∑
k=0
b2k
k!
)
|n〉〈n|. (5)
|α〉 = D(α) |0〉 = exp(−|α|2/2)∑∞n=0 αn√n! |n〉 is a coherent state represented as a displaced vacuum via the displace-
ment operator D(α) (from now on it will not be mentioned explicitly that |α| ≤ b for all displacement operators used
in this paper and for given b) and C = πb2 is a normalization constant. Note that calculation (5) for b→∞ without
the normalization is nothing else than well known resolving of unity giving the evidence of spanning the whole Hilbert
space.
Having defined the maximally mixed state let’s investigate which operations Alice uses for encryption. This trans-
formation should be as close as possible to the maximally state in the HS distance sense and the closeness will depend
on the number of used operations. Beforehand, we will note how to facilitate forthcoming tedious calculations on a
sample example. Suppose that Alice has e.g. four encryption operations, which displace the vacuum state to the same
distance r4 from the origin but under four different angles (from symmetrical reason these angles are multiples of
pi
2
in this case). Alice chooses these operations with the same probability. Now, if we write down the overall mixture
from the states, it can be shown that there exists a computationally advantageous “conformation” when the mixture
reads
̺4 =
1
4
4∑
q=1
|α4q〉〈α4q | = exp(−r24)
∞∑
m,n=0
rm+n4√
m!n!
|m〉〈n| δm′m , (6)
where m′ = m+ 4l, l = 1, . . . ,∞ and δm′m = 1 for all m (occupation number) else δm
′
m = 0. Informally, (6) is always a
real density matrix with off-diagonal non-zero “stripes” separated from main diagonal and from a neighbouring stripe
by three zero off-diagonals. ̺4 acquires relatively simple form (6) if α4q = r4e
iqϑ4q for ϑ4q =
pi
4 + (q − 1)pi2 . This can
be generalized for arbitrary number of states dispersed on a circle with given radius rp
̺p =
1
p
p∑
q=1
|αpq〉〈αpq | = exp(−r2p)
∞∑
m,n=0
rm+np√
m!n!
|m〉〈n| δm′m , (7)
4where p ∈ Z+,m′ = m+ pl and δm′m is defined as before. Favorable “p-conformations” (7) occur when αpq = rpeiqϑpq
for ϑpq =
pi
p
(2q−1). Now, we may proceed to the mixture characterizing all Alice’s encryption operations. She chooses
N ≥ 1 and defines rp = pb/N for p = 1, . . . , N . Then
ΦN =
1
M
N∑
p=1
p̺p =
1
M
N∑
p=1
p∑
q=1
D(αpq)|0〉〈0|D†(αpq) (8)
with normalizationM = N(N+1)2 . To sum up the protocol, Alice and Bob share a secret and random key which indexes
their operations. So, Alice equiprobably chooses from the set ofM displacement operatorsD(αpq) = exp(αpqa
†−α∗pqa)
where just one operator creates a coherent state on the circle of radius r1, two operators generate two states on the
circle of radius r2 and so forth up to N . Mixtures of the states on particular circles are in favourable form (7) and
the whole state is (8). The rest of the protocol is the same as in discrete state encryption. Alice sends the encrypted
state through a quantum channel towards Bob who makes Alice’s inverse operation to decrypt the state.
The keystone in quantum state encryption both discrete and CV is the fact that an unknown and arbitrary state can
be encrypted. If the state was known we would’t need this procedure at all because Alice could just send information
about the preparation of the state to Bob. So, it would suffice to encrypt this classical information with the Vernam
cipher. Also, our definition of CVPQC must be independent on the state which is to be encrypted. To provide this we
will find useful unitary invariance of the HS distance DHS(̺, σ) = DHS(U̺U
†, UσU †) for an arbitrary unitary matrix
U . This invariance is, however, necessary but not sufficient condition for our purpose. The second important issue
is due to advantageous algebraic properties of displacement operators. Let’s demonstrate it on Alice’s encryption
algorithm which stays the same as before. If she gets an arbitrary coherent state |β〉 (|β| ≤ b) she randomly chooses
one from M displacement operators D(αpq) (as the shared key with Bob dictates). Then, even if two displacement
operators generally do not commute we may write a general encryption TPCP (trace-preserving completely positive)
map
EN(|β〉) = 1
M
N∑
p=1
p∑
q=1
D(αpq)D(β)|0〉〈0|D†(β)D†(αpq) = 1
M
N∑
p=1
p∑
q=1
D(β)D(αpq)|0〉〈0|D†(αpq)D†(β) = D(β)ΦND†(β).
(9)
It is obvious that generally EN(|β〉) 6= ΦN (and similarly
∫
D(α)|β〉〈β|D†(α)d2α ∝ D(β)1 bD†(β) = 1 βb 6= 1 b) but
their HS distances are equivalent, i.e. DHS(1
β
b , EN(|β〉)) = DHS(1 b,ΦN ). Thus, we are henceforth entitled to make
all calculations of the HS distance between 1 βb and EN (|β〉) with explicit forms (5) and (8). After some calculations
we will see (Appendix B) that
D2HS
(
1
β
b , EN(|β〉)
)
≈
(
1
N + 1
)2
+O (N−4) , (10)
which holds for all for all input coherent states |β〉. The guess (10) is far from optimal (e.g. independent on b) and is
not even an inequality. But this doesn’t matter because the exact form can be derived (for details see Appendix A).
Its only problem is relative complexity so we cannot easily deduce the number of operations for a given level of secrecy.
Nevertheless, (10) asymptotically approaches to the exact expression (as is shown in Appendix B). Notice that in spite
of the derivation of (10) (or, next, analytical expression (12)) we still cannot reasonably define a CVPQC. We will do
so in section IV after presenting another assumptions regarding eavesdropping on our private quantum channel.
If we consider the described unitary invariance of the HS distance we write down lhs of (10)
D2HS(1 b,ΦN ) = Tr
(
(1 b − ΦN )2
)
= Tr
(
1 2b
)− 2Tr (1 bΦN ) + Tr (Φ2N) . (11)
5After some calculations (see mentioned Appendix A) we get a little bit lengthy expression
D2HS(1 b,ΦN) =
1
b2 exp(2b2)
(
exp(2b2)− I0
(
2b2
)− I1 (2b2))− 4 exp(−b2)
b2N(N + 1)
N∑
p=1
p
exp
(
r2p
) ∞∑
k=1
(
b
rp
)k
Ik(2rpb)
+
(
2
N(N + 1)
)2 [ N∑
p=1
p2
exp
(
2r2p
)
(
I0
(
2r2p
)
+ 2
∞∑
k=1
Ipk
(
2r2p
))
+
N∑
p1,p2=1
p1 6=p2
p1p2
exp
(
r2p1 + r
2
p2
)
(
I0(2R12) + 2
∞∑
k=1
Ip1p2k(2R12)
)]
, (12)
where rp = pb/N, rpl = plb/N,R12 = p1p2 (b/N)
2 and In(x) is a modified Bessel function of the first kind of order n
In(x) =
∞∑
s=0
(x
2
)n+2s 1
(n+ s)!s!
. (13)
However, as we declared, for a rough estimation of the number of operations for a given secrecy we will employ (10).
Using M = N(N+1)2 ≈ (N+1)
2
2 (and then again M ≈ N
2
2 ) we find that the dependence of the number of bits on the
HS distance (12) is n = logM = −2(1+ logDHS) + log
(
1 +
√
1 + CD2HS
)
≈ −1− 2 logDHS because the guess is in
particular precise for DHS ≪ 1. C is a constant (polynomial) bounding N−4 in (10) from above. By the numerical
simulations based on (12) for different b and M we see that the guess is accurate and for higher M even serves as a
relatively good upper bound.
Simplified encryption
Now, let’s see what is going to happen if we simplify our encryption protocol. The arrangement is the same,
i.e. Alice’s task is to encipher single-mode coherent states and her only knowledge is that the states are somewhere
inside the circle of radius r ≤ b. However, Alice’s technology is limited and we will tend to replace technologically
demanding displacements by simple phase shifts given by the well known time evolution |α(t)〉 = exp(−iHt/~) |α〉 with
the Hamiltonian H = ~ω(n + 12 ). The resulting state is |α(t)〉 = exp(−iωt/2) |α exp(−iωt)〉 so the state undertakes
the rotation about Θ = ωt regardless the distance (which stays preserved) from the phase space origin. Note that
unitary operator U = exp(−iHt/~) has the form
U = exp
(
− iωt
2
) ∞∑
n=0
exp(−iωtn)|n〉〈n|. (14)
Next, suppose that Alice is equipped with p encryption operations where she can rotate the state about q multiples
of 2π/p. So, Θq = q2π/p where q = 1, . . . , p. Then, for someone without any information about the angle of rotation
chosen by Alice (e.g. Eve) the state leaving Alice is in the form
˜̺p =
1
p
p∑
q=1
Uq|α〉〈α|U−1q =
1
p
p∑
q=1
(|α〉〈α|)q =
1
p
p∑
q=1
|αe q2pip 〉〈αe q2pip | (15)
where Uq is (14) with Θq = ωtq = q2π/p. Because Alice doesn’t know where exactly the state |α〉 is placed we cannot
write an explicit form of ˜̺q. Apparently, however, for arbitrary p it can be transformed to our favourite state (7),
again with the help of unitary operation (14)
̺p(rp) = U ˜̺pU
−1 = exp(−r2p)
∞∑
m,n=0
rm+np√
m!n!
|m〉〈n| δm′m , (16)
where m′ = m + pl, l = 1, . . . ,∞. It remains to show that 1 b = U1 bU−1. This can be readily seen from the fact
that (14) is diagonal. This is vital. Now we can easily calculate the HS distance of ̺p(rp) and 1 b and regarding
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FIG. 1: (A) In the case of technologically simplified encryption Alice has at disposal just one displacement operator and
several phase shifts. The depicted HS distances (17) (here for b = 2 and p = 1, . . . , 20 determining the number of used
encryption operations) illustrates how Alice chooses the proper displacement D(rmin) and a correct number of phase shifts.
We see that for p >∼ 6 the minimum is “saturated” so Alice needs just six phase shifts for the best approximation to full-
encryption protocol. Another rising of p doesn’t bring any advantage. The dash-dotted curve connects minima for their better
visibility. (B) Numerical solutions of Eq. (18) for different b (i.e. growing input range of states coming to Alice) tells us which
displacement is needed in the case of simplified encryption. For these values of rmin the HS distance (17) reaches the lowest
values. A special case of b = 2 is highlighted to see its correspondence with the picture on the left.
the unitary invariance of the HS distance the result will be valid for any arbitrary input coherent state (this trick is
akin to that one used in (9)). After the calculation we get the same result as in (12) but for fixed p and without the
summation over p1, p2
D2HS(1 b, ̺p) =
1
b2 exp(2b2)
(
exp(2b2)− I0
(
2b2
)− I1 (2b2))− 2
exp (b2) b2
1
exp
(
r2p
) ∞∑
k=1
(
b
rp
)k
Ik(2rpb)
+
1
exp
(
2r2p
)
(
I0
(
2r2p
)
+ 2
∞∑
k=1
Ipk
(
2r2p
))
. (17)
The behaviour of this quantity is completely different compared to (12) describing the original case as can be seen in
Fig. 1 (A). As an example we put b = 2 and we see that there exists rmin < b for which the HS distance between (5)
and (16) reaches its minimum for sufficiently high p. In order to find a radius minimizing the HS distance of these
density matrices for various b (we put p → ∞ and thus 2∑∞k=1 Ipk (2r2p) vanishes – we seek for, say, a saturated
minimum which is independent on the number of operations on a given circle) we can calculate
∂
(
D2HS(1 b, ̺p)
)
∂r
p→∞
=
4
exp (2r2min)
(
rminI1
(
2r2min
)− rminI0 (2r2min)+ exp
(
2r2min
)
b exp (b2)
I1 (2rminb)
)
= 0. (18)
The solution is the root of the expression in parentheses. Unfortunately, an analytical solution wasn’t found so
numerical calculation of rmin for several b ∈ (0, 7〉 is depicted in Fig. 1 (B).
What are the physical consequences of this whole simplification? From Fig. 1 (A) we see that a maximally mixed
state 1 b can be in the distance sense substituted with a mixture of coherent state on a circle (with radius rmin
where the diversion from 1 b is smallest) and the mixing requires relatively few encryption operations (low p for the
distance saturation). It holds not only for b = 2 what is the case in the picture. So, now we can make the process
of encryption/decryption technologically easier. We equip Alice/Bob with mentioned phase shifts leading to (16)
and just one displacement operator D(rmin). Every incoming coherent state is first displaced and then encrypted by
choosing a phase shift (indexed by a secret key). The role of Fig. 1 (B) is in a proper choice of rmin for given b. Finally,
Alice examines Fig. 1 (A) to select a sufficient number p of phase shifts for which the minimum of HS distance (17)
stays essentially the same.
7The important point is that incoming coherent states come to Alice randomly and equiprobably for given b so
after this simplified encryption (and for many encryption instances) they are as close as possible to full-fashioned
encrypted states as they would be if processed by using (8), i.e. the case of fully technologically equipped Alice and
Bob, respectively. The overall advantage is the use of just one technologically demanding operation which doesn’t
need to be tuned for given b (it stays fixed in the encryption protocol described at the beginning of chapter III).
IV. EAVESDROPPING ON ENCRYPTED CV STATES
Quantum channels are TPCP maps on quantum states. Following the classical channel coding theorem [31] one
may ask how much information is a quantum channel able to convey. This question naturally leads to the definition of
quantum channel capacity (for a nice survey on various quantum channel capacities see Ref. [32]) as the maximum of
the accessible information over the probability distributions of the input states ensemble {pi, σi} entering the channel
(after classical-quantum coding onto input quantum states xi ⇋ σi the ensemble of classical messages is indicated
by the variable X = {p(xi), xi} where p(xi) ≡ pi). The accessible information Iacc itself is the maximization over all
measurement of the mutual information I(X ;Y ) with the variable Y = {p (yj), yj} giving the probability p (yj) of the
result yj (an output alphabet) of a measurement on the channel output. Sometimes it might be difficult to calculate
the accessible information to determine the channel capacity. Then, we can estimate the accessible information from
above by the Holevo bound
χ ({pi, σi}) = S
(∑
i
piσi
)
−
∑
i
piS(σi), (19)
for which was proved [33] that χ ≥ Iacc (S(̺) is the von Neumann entropy) reaching equality if all σi commute.
In our case we try to get as close as possible to our maximally mixed state (5) with TPCP map (8) (or, generally,
to 1 βb with (9)) which both belong to the class of bosonic channels [19, 20]. However, our task is quite different from
reaching the highest quantum channel capacity (what means “tuning” of pi). Now, the variable X is fixed. For our
purpose the Holevo bound can tell us what is the upper bound on information which is a third party (Eve) able
to learn from her very best (that is optimal) measurement on the quantum channel. The question now is of what
state we should calculate the Holevo bound to find Eve’s maximum of attainable information on incoming states.
Unlike the discrete case (perfect and approximate encryption) the condition of perfect and acceptable closeness of
an encrypted state to the maximally mixed state is not in this case sufficient. Let’s demonstrate the reason for this
difference on the Bloch sphere (i.e. perfect qubit encryption). If Alice encrypts an unknown qubit (with a PQC
compound from e.g. four Pauli matrices) she gets a maximally mixed two-qubit state (normalized unity matrix). It
means that Eve cannot construct any measurement giving her information on the state. Moreover, even if she had a
priori information on the state (in the sense that Alice gets and encrypts many copies of the same unknown state)
she wouldn’t be able to use any method of unknown quantum states reconstruction [29]. She wouldn’t get any clue
where to find the state because all are transformed (encrypted) to the maximally mixed state dwelling in the center
of the sphere. Unfortunately, this is not our case. Here, if Alice encrypts many identical coherent states (howbeit
unknown) Eve could in principle reconstruct in which part of the phase space the encryption had been carried out.
Because we next suppose that encryption operations are publicly known (naturally not the secret key sequence itself)
Eve then could be able to deduce the original state from many variant ciphers of the same state. So we will suppose
that incoming state do not exhibit such statistics and, moreover, they are distributed equiprobably and randomly in
the whole region of considering (i.e. within the circle of radius r ≤ b) [36]. Less restrictive requirement could be a
distribution independent on the phase and changing only with the distance from the origin (rotationally invariant)
what will be discussed at the end of this chapter.
Based on theses thoughts, we may finally define CVPQC. We call the object {B, PB, EN(|β〉), 1 βb } as CVPQC whereB is the set of all coherent states |β〉 (|β| ≤ b) with distribution PB around the origin of phase space, EN (|β〉) is the
TPCP map defined in (9) and 1 βb is maximally mixed state centered around an input state |β〉 (displaced (5)). Let’s
note that the definition of CVPQC is valid for all coherent mixed states of the general form ̺β =
∑
i pi(|β〉〈β|)i with∑
i pi = 1 and |β|i ≤ b, ∀i because of convexity of HS norm. The situation is similar as in [4] for the operator norm.
Considering the assumptions from the previous paragraph let’s focus on the problem of security on the channel.
For our purpose we employ an integral version of (19). First note that we are now interested in the limiting case when
Alice uses infinitely many encryption operations [37]. More importantly, it remains to correctly answer the question
posed above. That is, what actually calculate as the Holevo bound? We know that Eve will measure on the encrypted
80 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
0.5
1
1.5
b
H
ol
ev
o 
bo
un
d 
 (b
its
)
FIG. 2: The Holevo bound represents an upper bound for information Eve is able to get from her best measurement on the
encrypted channel. The bigger is the set of states coming to Alice (growing b) the more information Eve can extract. This is
caused by better discriminability of Eve’s measuring apparatus. Nevertheless, relatively low calculated values of the Holevo
bound for our CVPQC given by Eq. (21) limits Eve in eavesdropping on the channel.
channel to get any information on incoming states (states before the encryption). To learn something about position
of a coherent state before encryption Eve must try to distinguish among objects which preserve some information
about input states location in phase space. In other words Eve has to choose a correct “encoding” σi from Eq. (19)
but now for a continuous index. Due to the used encryption operation (9) (which in our case N → ∞ transforms to
1
β
b as is proved in Appendix A) a state 1
β
b is that object which preserves the information on placement of an incoming
state |β〉 because is centered around it. Then, a continuous version of (19) reads
χ
({P (β), 1 βb }) = S(Λ˜2b)−
∫
d2β P (β)S
(
1
β
b
)
, (20)
where Λ˜2b is a total state leaving Alice’s apparatus (normalized Eq. (22)), P (β) is an input distribution from the
CVPQC definition and 1 βb = D(β)1 bD
†(β). Since S(D(β)1 bD†(β)) = S(1 b) for all β it immediately follows from (20)
χ
(
{P (β), 1 βb }
)
= S
(
Λ˜2b
)− S(1 b). (21)
To calculate the Holevo bound (21) it remains to find the total state after the encryption procedure provided that
Eve doesn’t know neither which particular coherent state |β〉 comes to Alice nor the key used for encryption. Thus,
because the incoming distribution P (β) ≡ P (x, ϑ) = 1 (no need to normalize it here) is publicly known then Alice
quite accidentally experiences 1 b also as a total incoming state. So, the state leaving Alice is in the form
Λ2b =
∫
d2αD(α)
(∫
d2β |β〉〈β|
)
D†(α) =
∫ b
0
∫ 2pi
0
d2β
(∫ b
0
∫ 2pi
0
d2αD(α)|β〉〈β|D†(α)
)
=
∫ b
0
xdx
∫ b
0
ydy
∫ 2pi
0
dϕ
(∫ 2pi
0
dϑ |β + α〉〈β + α|
)
= 2π
∞∑
n=0
|n〉〈n|
n!
∫ b
0
∫ b
0
∫ 2pi
0
dxdydϕ e−R
2
R2n+1xy, (22)
where R2 = x2 + y2 − 2xy cosϕ ≤ 4b2, d2α = ydydϕ, d2β = xdxdϑ and D(α) are encryption displacements (again
uniformly distributed as the CVPQC definition dictates and without a normalization). Shortly said, by changing the
order of integration we see that Λ2b is diagonal. Concretely, the term in the parentheses in the reordered integral
9(second row in (22)) is an ordinary coherent state |β + α〉 (r is its distance from the origin and abscissae formed by
points in the phase space (α, β) and (β, 0) contain a relative angle ϕ) and is integrated out over the phase. This
gives a diagonal matrix and next integrating just changes the statistics on the diagonal. Note that Λ2b “covers” the
area of radius 2b in phase space. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain an analytical solution of (22). Nevertheless,
based on (22) we may generally write (tilde indicates normalization) Λ˜2b =
∑
n λ
(b)
n |n〉〈n|, where λ(b)n are needed to be
determined numerically. Inserting Λ˜2b =
∑
n λ
(b)
n |n〉〈n| and (5) into Eq. (21) we find the desired Holevo bound what
is depicted in Fig. 2. It is interesting to note that the convergence of the Holevo bound is tightly connected with the
energy constraint
∫
Tr
(
̺βa
†a
)
dPB ≤ n¯b which is automatically satisfied through the finiteness of b in our CVPQC.
For a general distribution P (β) it is satisfied due to the natural condition
∫
d2βP (β) = 1. The importance of the
constraint has been already recognized for capacities of bosonic channels [19, 20, 21, 22].
From Fig. 2 we see that there is no chance for Eve to find which coherent state actually passes on the channel.
This is not so surprising considering the non-discrete character of the input distribution P (β). But Eve cannot divide
the appropriate area at least roughly to approximately devise the position of a particular encrypted state 1 βb (and
from this to derive the desired position of an incoming state |β〉). From the informational point of view the Holevo
bound results could be interpreted such that for a given b there doesn’t exist any optimal measurement enabling Eve
to divide the circle of the radius 2b in more than 2χ sections and tells her in which one the encrypted state occurs.
Having fixed the input distribution P (β) of coherent states coming to Alice another way how to next decrease the
Holevo bound might be a different definition of an encryption distribution in Eq. (22) where a uniform distribution
is implicitly used. If this distribution was symmetrical (i.e. rotationally invariant, for example Gaussian one) then
we would find Eq. (22) diagonal as well and thus we could easily calculate (21). However, a big challenge is proving
the optimality of such distribution function. Anyhow, it means that by minimizing the Holevo bound (21) within the
context of the CVPQC definition we could tackle the previously mentioned problem of maximality of our mixed state
by putting this more suitable distribution into Eq. (5).
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we have opened the problem of continuous variable encryption of unknown quantum states and
introduced the concept of private quantum channels (CVPQC) into this area. For the start we have restricted ourselves
on coherent states which belong to the important class of states with the Gaussian distribution function. A particular
continuous variable private quantum channel was proposed and we have studied its properties. Firstly, it means
that we have established the notion of so called maximally mixed state with regard to its non-discrete (continuous
variable) nature. For this kind of mixture we were interested how many encryption operations are sufficient to consider
an incoming coherent state to be secure. This quantity was determined by calculating the Hilbert-Schmidt distance
between the mixture and the encrypted state for an arbitrary number of encryption operations. Next, we have studied
the possibility of eavesdropping on the quantum channel. We have supposed that Eve is able to perform an optimal
measurement to get the maximum information on the state (which is limited by the calculated Holevo bound) or is
able to use some quantum state estimation methods. The second possibility (which requires Eve’s a priori information
on the statistics of the states in the sense that she knows that Alice gets many copies of the same unknown coherent
state to encrypt) restricts the CVPQC definition. The way how to avoid this kind of attack is the most desired
direction of next research.
Beside the above mentioned topic we have addressed many more intriguing questions which can stimulate another
research in this area and improve the existing protocol. Among many topics let’s name the problem of either universal
distribution of incoming state or a universal distribution of encryption operations or both. This is tightly connected
with the freedom in choice of the definition of maximally mixed state. We have seen that there exists a certain
ambiguity in the definition of what we call here the maximally mixed state in phase space. Its relevance is measured
by the accessible information (or eventually limited from above by the Holevo bound) Eve can get and the question
is what kind of definition of the maximally mixed state is the most appropriate for a given incoming distribution
of states. Together with this topics another generalization presents itself. It is the possibility to encrypt another
Gaussian states, especially squeezed states.
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APPENDIX A
Eq. (11) consists of three parts. Let’s calculate them step by step. If we rewrite (5) in a more suitable form we get
diagonal elements in the form
1 b(n, n) =
1
b2 exp(b2)
( ∞∑
m=n+1
b2m
m!
)
|n〉〈n|. (A1)
Now, we may easily calculate
Tr
(
1 2b
)
=
1
b4 exp(2b2)
∞∑
n=1
( ∞∑
m=n
b2m
m!
)2
=
1
b4 exp(2b2)
( ∞∑
n=1
b4n
(n!)2
n+ 2
∞∑
k=1
∞∑
n=1
b4n+2k
n!(n+ k)!
n
)
=
1
b4 exp(2b2)
( ∞∑
n=0
b4(n+1)
n!(n+ 1)!
+ 2
∞∑
k=1
∞∑
n=0
b4(n+1)+2k
n!(n+ k + 1)!
)
=
1
b2 exp(2b2)
(
I1
(
2b2
)
+ 2
∞∑
k=1
Ik+1
(
2b2
))
=
1
b2 exp(2b2)
(
exp(2b2)− I0
(
2b2
)− I1 (2b2)) , (A2)
where Is is a modified Bessel function of the first kind of order s. The last row is due to identity
I0(x) + 2
∞∑
k=1
Ik(x) = exp(x). (A3)
For the calculation of the cross element Tr (1 bΦN ) we use (A1) again. But for the sake of clarity we will calculate
only pTr (1 b̺p). The overall trace is given by summation Tr (1 bΦN ) = 1/M
∑N
p=1 pTr (1 b̺p) what follows from (8).
From (7) we get a general diagonal element
p̺p(n, n) = p exp
(−r2p) r2npn! |n〉〈n| (A4)
and then
pTr (1 b̺p) =
1
b2 exp(b2)
p
exp(r2p)
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=n+1
r2np
n!
b2m
m!
=
1
b2 exp(b2)
p
exp(r2p)
∞∑
k=1
∞∑
n=0
b2(n+k)
n!(n+ k)!
r2np
=
1
b2 exp(b2)
p
exp(r2p)
∞∑
k=1
(
b
rp
)k
Ik(2rpb). (A5)
Overall, we have
Tr (1 bΦN ) =
2
N(N + 1)
1
b2 exp(b2)
N∑
p=1
p exp
(−r2p)
∞∑
k=1
(
b
rp
)k
Ik(2rpb). (A6)
The third part can be written
Tr
(
Φ2N
)
=
(
2
N(N + 1)
)2
Tr

 N∑
i,j=1
pipj̺pi̺pj

 (A7)
11
where particular summands have the form
Tr
(
pipj̺pi̺pj
)
=
pipj
exp
(
r2pi + r
2
pj
)
(
I0(2Rij) + 2
∞∑
k=1
Ipipjk(2Rij)
)
, (A8)
what can be easily seen if we substitute (7) into a slight generalization of (A3)
I0(2xy) + 2
∞∑
k=1
Ik(2xy) = exp(x
2) exp(y2), (A9)
where for our purpose x = rpi = pib/N, y = rpj = pjb/N,Rij = pipj(b/N)
2.
APPENDIX B
When performing a limit transition it can be shown that limN→∞ |ΦN − 1 b|=0. The only nonzero elements of ΦN
stays on its diagonal and are equal to diagonal elements of 1 b. Let’s demonstrate it on first diagonal element (n = 0).
From (7) and (8) we see that
ΦN (0, 0) =
2
N(N + 1)
N∑
p=1
p exp(−r2p)|0〉〈0| =
2
N(N + 1)
N∑
p=1
∞∑
n=0
(−1)nb2nn!p
2n+1
N2n
|0〉〈0|. (B1)
Assuming that
N∑
p=1
pd =
1
d+ 1
d+1∑
p=1
(−1)d+1−p
(
d+ 1
p
)
Bd+1−pNp, (B2)
where Bn are Bernoulli numbers, inserting the highest polynomial
Nd+1
d+1 (lower polynomials subsequently tends to
zero) from (B2) into (B1) and finally letting N →∞ we get (omitting ketbra)
lim
N→∞
ΦN (0, 0) = 2 lim
N→∞
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n b
2n
n!
N2(n+2)
N2n+1(N + 1)
1
2(n+ 1)
=
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n b
2n
n!
= 1− exp(−b2)b2 ≡ 1 b(0, 0) (B3)
as can be seen from (A1). In this way we could continue for all diagonal elements of ΦN (n, n). But turn our attention
elsewhere. If we realize that a general diagonal element is of the form
ΦN (n, n) =
2
N(N + 1)
1
n!
N∑
p=1
p exp(−r2p)r2np |n〉〈n|, (B4)
we see that the expression for the HS distance (12) can be simplified in the following way
D2HS(1 b,ΦN ) = |1 b − ΦN |2 (B5)
+ 2
(
2
N(N + 1)
)2  N∑
k=1
k2
exp (2r2k)
( ∞∑
n=1
Ikn
(
2r2k
))
+
N∑
k1,k2=1
k1 6=k2
k1k2
exp
(
r2k1 + r
2
k2
)
( ∞∑
n=1
Ik1k2n(2R12)
) .
This form will help us in deriving (10)
|1 b − ΦN | =
∞∑
k=0
|1 b(k, k)− ΦN (k, k)| ≈
∞∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣1 b(k, k)
(
1− N
N + 1
)∣∣∣∣ = 1N + 1 (B6)
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and hence |1 b − ΦN |2 ≈
(
1
N+1
)2
. We again put the highest polynomial N
d+1
d+1 into ΦN (k, k) and used the normal-
ization condition
∑∞
k=0 1 b(k, k) = 1. Second part of (B5) tends to zero even faster. We can see it with the help
of (A9) from which follows that
∑∞
n=1 Ikn
(
2r2k
)≪ exp (2r2k) especially for higher k (and, of course, similarly for the
second summand in square brackets of expression (B5)). From these considerations (10) follows and, not surprisingly,
asymptotically approaches the exact value.
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